荷蘭與丹麥對於法學博士畢業的要求

1. 博士是一個職缺，不是學生。
2. 因為是職缺，所以有薪水，同時在學校被視為職員的一份子。
3. 因為有薪水，家庭生活不會因此停滯，很多博士生在讀博期間結婚生子。
4. 因為很多博士畢業都會參與學術研究、智庫政策研究、或教學，所以博士生在學校會參與教學、研究中心運作。
5. 當然博士生的核心，還是其論文研究，但是研究主題通常都不是純憑個人興趣，多半跟該國社會或國際組織特定需要有關，有其實用性質與社會貢獻。
6. 我們被期待三年或四年完成論文，除非有特殊情況，在政府資助下，沒有無限期念下去的可能。所以，作博士研究，不僅有時間壓力，也有一定意義: 請在一定期限內完成論文。
7. 丹麥認為，最好在博士班期間，到其他國家的大學或研究中心交換，不要長期待在一處。
8. 我們也鼓勵，博士班期間，可以去跟研究有關的其他地方實習，例如國際組織。

EU Risk Governance : Some Potential Inconsistencies

From section 2 to section 3, it has been indicated that the ambitious risk governance regimes under EU law should aim to make a balance between free movement of goods and a high level protection of health, safety and environment[1]. Also, in the process of risk decision-making, regulators need to strike a balance between scientific and non-scientific concerns[2]. Therefore, the use of sound science and the incorporation of social and ethics concerns through public participation in the process of risk decision-making are both equally important for good risk governance[3]. However, the above sections also have shown that, in practice, many potential inconsistencies might exist between the ambitious claims and the real practices in EU risk governance.

In section 2, it has been mentioned that, in order to regain public confidence in the administration of risk by the EU and Member States, regulators chose to redesign the risk governance regimes by separating risk assessment from risk management and assigning risk assessment to the new creation of independent agencies composed of qualified and independent staff[4]. However, though the Commission also claimed to strengthen transparency and public participation in the process of risk decision-making to reflect social and ethic values[5], regulators in practice still tend to solely rely on scientific expertise to make decisions[6]. Sometimes, regulators even hind behind scientific expertise to pursue their own goals[7]. Therefore, it seems that the first  potential inconsistency existing between ambitious claims and the real practices by the regulators is that regulators  might not really add social and ethic concerns into their considerations.  Rather, it seems the dominating factor in the process of decision making is still scientific standards[8]. It can be also observed that in Commission’s Communication, the Commission did not pay much attention on non-scientific concerns like social and ethic values as it initially claimed to do[9].

The second potential inconsistency existing  between ambitious claims and the real practices by regulators is that new independent agencies might fail  to fulfill its tasks by independently examining the product promoted by producers. While those independent agencies claim to provide independent and excellent scientific advice, in practice, as Marjolein, Van Asselt and Vos have observed in Monsanto cases, they only examined product data provided by producers, rather than conducting independent studies by themselves[10]. In addition, they have even shown an uncertainty intolerance attitude to deny or refuse any uncertain information in their own assessment[11]. It is entirely contrary to the natures of uncertain risks they are required to assess, since uncertain risks, in essence, cannot be fully predicted or determined by science[12]. Since science cannot certain uncertain risks as it did for simple risks, it is therefore necessary to use the precautionary principle to protect important interests such as human health. If in practice, experts tend to deny r the existence of uncertainty, this  might   lead to worse situations that uncertain risks have not been adequately addressed[13]. 

The third potential inconsistency  existing between ambitious claims and the real practices by regulators is that, while the Commission claimed itself as a risk regulator to make risk management decisions, in practice, it seems that the Commission tends to follow the advice offered by independent agencies[14]. Although both academic and the decision of the European Courts claimed it should be for the political organs to make risk management decisions[15], in practice, as scholars observed, the relationship between the Commission and independent agencies is as the blind driver (the Commission) guided by independent agencies[16]. The agency, per se, might  have become the real risk manager in EU risk governance. This would  lead to the concern about accountability, since agencies, as the real player, is not accountable for the public and is not subject to judicial review of the European Courts[17].

The fourth potential inconsistency existing  between ambitious claims and the real practices by the European Courts is that, though the Commission should be bound by its Communication[18], also the European Courts confirmed this point in their rulings[19], the European Courts did not virtually review the regulatory practices of the Commission as the Commission promised in its Communication . In Pfizer, the General Court did not examine whether the Commission has presented the equal scientific evidence to support its own decisions, when its decisions is contrary to the opinions provided by the relevant agencies or professional committees[20]. Again, later in Gowan[21], the court of Justice of the European Union did not require the procedural guarantees the EU institutions ought to offer by asking the Commission to provide a statement of reasons with a scientific level at least commensurate with the opinions offered by its committees, when it departed from the scientific opinions of its committees[22].

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[1] See A. Alemanno, The Shaping of European Risk Regulation by Community Courts, Jean Monnet Working Paper 18/08, p. 8.

[2] See M. Everson and E. Vos, European Risk Governance in a Global Context, in E. Vos, (ed.). European Risk Governance: its science, its inconclusiveness and its effectiveness, Connex Report Series 2008, p. 22.

[3] Ibid, p. 25.

[4] See G. Skogstad, ‘Legitimacy and/or policy effectiveness? Network governance and GMO regulation in the European Union’, Journal of European Public Policy, (2003), 10 (3), pp. 321-338, p. 325.

[5] See, M. Everson and E. Vos, supra note 2, p. 17.

[6] Ibid, p. 17.

[7] M.B. A. Van Asselt and E. Vos, ‘The Precautionary Principle and the Uncertainty Paradox’, Journal of Risk Research, 2006 9 (4) 313, pp. 331-333.

[8] M. Everson and E. Vos, supra note 2, p. 21.

[9] E. Fisher,‘Reviews: The European Commission’s Communication on the Precautionary Principle’, Journal of Environmental Law, 12 (3) 2000, p. 404.

[10] See B. A, Marjolein, M. B. A. Van Asselt and E. Vos, ‘Wrestling with Uncertain Risks : EU Regulation of GMOs and the Uncertainty Paradox’, Journal of Risk Research, 2008, Vol. 11, No. 1-2, 281-300, p. 284.

[11] Ibid, pp. 284-285.

[12] M.B. A. Van Asselt and E. Vos, ‘The Precautionary Principle and the Uncertainty Paradox’, Journal of Risk Research, 2006 9 (4) 313, pp. 314-316.

[13] B. Wynne, ‘Creating Public Alienation: Expert Cultures of Risks and Ethics’, Science as Culture, 2001, 10 (4), 445-481, p. 458.

[14] E. Vos and F. A. Wendler , ‘Food Safety Regulation at the EU Level’, in E. Vos and F. A. Wendler (eds.), Food Safety Regulation in Europe-A comparative Institutional Analysis (Ius Commune Europarum, 62), (Anmtwerp: Intersentia), 65-138, p. 122.

[15] See Case T-13/99, Pfizer, para. 151.

[16] E. Vos and F. A. Wendler, supra note 14, p. 122.

[17] See M. de Visser, “Judicial accountability and new governance ", Legal Issues of Economic Integration, (2010) 37(1), pp. 41-60.

[18] N. de Sadeleer, ‘The Precautionary Principle in EC Health and Environmental Law’, European Law Journal, 12 (2) 2006, 139-173, pp. 141-142.

[19] See Case T-13/99, Pfizer,  para. 125.

[20] E. Vos, ‘Antibiotics, the Precautionary Principle and the Court of First Instance’, 11 MJ (2) 2004, p. 199.

[21] Case C-77/09, Gowan Comércio Internacional e Serviços Lda v Ministero della Salute, Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 22 December 2010, not yet reported.

[22] A. Alemanno, Annotation of European Court of Justice, Case C-79/09, Gowan Comércio Internacional e Serviços Lda v. Ministero Della Salute (Precautionary Principle), (2011) 48 CML Rev. 4, at p. 9.