值得收藏的對話錄: 徐博士開講~一個科技人的心聲: 台灣電子業的將來

這篇是徐博士，我的老同學的貢獻，因為覺得對話值得紀錄，編輯如下，所有的相關權利應歸我的老同學所有。感嘆，那些年我們在靜心時，都沒想到世界變得如此複雜吧。

1.          徐: 4年國防替代役，吸引了不少台清交成的科學、工程優秀學生，4年後年紀也大了，收入也高了，工作也有保障了，可能就不想出國了。" 這點的確是這樣沒錯。

黃回應: 其實，台灣的GDP 十年停滯不前，一直沒辦法產業升級，工科的男兒們也要負一點責任啦；當然，另一方面，商業創新也很重要。

徐: 這點其實也不能怪我們啦！剛畢業那時候大多數人包括我只想要出去賺錢，有的人是因為小時候家裡環境不好所以要趕快出來賺錢，有的人是因為公司開的條件實在太誘人(一年幾百萬能不吸引人嗎？)

黃: 唉，我知道，這是 " 結構 " 問題，但你看到這個結構，慢慢不能用了，還蠻擔心未來台灣產業的。

徐: 相較之下出國唸書當然沒有什麼吸引力，當時PTT留學版最流行的說法就是: 你要考慮機會成本啊！唸碩士沒有獎學金(燒自己的錢)，念博士要花個五年(不用花自己的錢，可是比你同學少賺很多錢)，又不一定唸的完。還要考GRE/TOEFL......

黃: 是呀，我同意呀；我現在如果在馬大念博士，也沒有錢，肯定也是少賺了一些錢，但是這個社會都沒有人去做基礎科學研究或冷僻學門，產業一直缺乏核心技術，大家都不生孩子，持續下去，我們每個人都是理性的經濟人，但這個社會就會衰敗下去；by the way, 後來怎麼會改變想法，出來念博士呢?

徐: 我只能說，我承認年輕時我的想法是滿膚淺的，眼光也看不到這麼遠。畢竟當時的自己還算是個中產階級，待的產業當時看來也不錯，對於未來的事還有身在其他產業的人們的事也不太願意花時間去想去體會。有點像是社會的既得利益者不食人間煙火(我的既得利益相較其他人不算多，沒拿過公司的股票，幾乎正常上下班)......但是有一天當公司開始半哄半勸員工簽切結書、放無薪假、接受超長工時......等等這把火燒到自己身上，你就開始慢慢能體會以前你體會不到的感覺。

徐: 念博士這件事，說老實話，當時只是想找一個可以兼顧家庭 (老婆在波士頓) 又不用花自己錢就可以留在美國的辦法。念的領域對我來說是新的，雖然都是在 EE 裡面。其實沒有什麼太偉大的目的。不過現在回頭看過去這兩年，我會說如果真的讓我拿到這個學位的話，我認為這段期間受的訓練挺值得的。

黃: ‎" 我只能說，我承認年輕時我的想法是滿膚淺的，眼光也看不到這麼遠。" 同學，別這樣說，大家都是凡人，我之前是找不到好工作，才去經濟部當法務的，根本就不是計畫好的；唉，你在美國應該看到更多科技的進展，對台灣的前景感覺如何呢?

2.          徐: 其他產業我不熟就不評論了。半導體這邊，DRAM 完蛋，LCD 的未來會步上 DRAM 的後塵，在可看見的未來有競爭力而且能夠搬上檯面的只有台積電&高階製程設計服務(重點是服務而不是製造)。以上是針對半導體製造&設計服務而言。IC 設計好一些，不過大部分也都是做 Me Too 的產品或者靠富爸爸在背後撐腰，可預見的未來是照這樣下去會變成打不進新產品供應鏈 (前無去路，你看現在的 smart phone & TouchPad)，中國也慢慢會趕上(後有追兵，前一陣子有消息出來說中國的 IC 設計公司在高階製程下線 tape-out 的數量已經大過台灣的設計公司，說明台灣大部分的公司無心 & 沒有錢投入研發)。

黃: 將一般給科技業的租稅優惠取消，改成鼓勵投入研發項目，才給優惠是一條路，但是，我們現在在搞選舉，這種得罪大老闆的事，藍綠都不想幹；問題是，如你所說，就算有人才，老闆們不願投入資金，也枉然。

3.          徐: 我覺得比較可惜的是很多人才最後都跑去系統廠，就是人家做筆電手機代工的那些，不是說我輕看系統廠，而是他們做的東西毛利都太低，對公司和國家能產出的經濟貢獻太低了。台積電或IC設計公司毛利相對較高，不過一部分是政府租稅補貼的效果，而且繳稅也繳的少，對公司和國家能產出的經濟貢獻不能說沒有，只能說不算太高。DRAM 和 LCD 就別提了，失敗的產業政策不提也罷。馬總統上電視說不救DRAM不配當總統的話歷歷在目，當時我的想法是1.馬總統不懂這個產業 2.幕僚也不懂 3. 又是一樁政府&銀行被綁架血淋淋的案例。

台北市政府措施在美牛事件中的WTO適法性爭議

當代重要的挑戰之一，就是同時理解國內行政法與國際行政法，而且要避免以內國語言、思考習慣去解讀國際行政法，這是我認為國內學界可能出現的盲點。

WTO 法說: 中央政府在憲法的可能架構內，為地方政府的貿易限制措施負責。所以假使地方政府在該國憲法架構下有自治權，確實中央政府有機會藉此託辭，受限於憲法架構，無法履行國際法承諾。但這是純粹法律、單看WTO法的玩法，它忽略了國際法生成於各國外交人員的互動中成為習慣、成文法化成為條約(意思是大家不是這樣在玩遊戲呀)，忽略了國際法的基本原則仍舊是: 不管你國內法規怎麼定，那是你家的事，就是要盡力履行國際條約義務。也忽略了WTO上訴小組明確在判決指出，WTO法不應與基本國際法分離(恰巧跟美國學者的論調相反)。也就是說，純談法理，任由地方政府制定貿易限制措施，不一定站的住腳的。

何況，純粹法律的操作，更忽略對手是誰的國際現實。

我們對法院的想像: 推動專家參審制

傳統上，對於法院的想像，在於法院應由專業的法律人擔任法官構成。可是，從以前的商業案件，到後來的海事、專利、稅務等案件，許多歐洲國家都有專家參審的制度。這在在說明，對於審判者的定義，不應侷限於專業的法律人。如果十九世紀，海事、商業案件被視為新穎，如果今日越來越多專利、稅務、投資、貿易爭議，被要求由特別的、國際的法院或仲裁處理的種種實踐，不只是提醒我們慣性思考中對審判者定義的狹隘，更提醒我們越來越多的案件，需要也要求審判者了解事實，光靠特別法院或仲裁可能不足以滿足紛爭解決的需求的。也因此，重新定義審判者或法院的組成，或許可以從促成專家參審制，透過專家參審官與法官合作共同審理案件，讓法院真正有能力審理案件事實。這也是回應專業分工日趨分殊的社會，適時促進法院回應社會變遷的一種辦法，發揮其被設定於好好解決紛爭的功能。

假使，如法國的研究顯示，法院甚少偏離專家意見，甚至將自己應處理的事實問題轉問專家，那我們寧可那個實質做決定的人變成專審官，至少他的偏見可以被檢視，他為他的決定實際負責，接受公眾監督，遠勝於他躲在專家的角色中，特別當交叉訊問在國際訴訟中不可見時。

What the EU Court Can Learn From the WTO Regarding the Use of Expert

Despite the limits of the use of individual experts in the current WTO dispute settlement, it is still a positive development to increase the use of expertise advice when assessing the scientific-based measures^[1]. Expert’s advice not only ensures the expert legitimacy^[2] of the panel’s decision, but it also reduces the level of scientific involvement of panels in disputes^[3]. Considering the merits of the use of an expert review group aforementioned, as the Pfizer case has shown the necessity for the EU court to engage in scientific issues, it is reasonable to encourage the EU Court to increase the use of an expert group to assist it to deal with scientific debates.

Currently, when assessing the scientific-based measures, the EU Court tends not to appoint the expert and only seeks the information from the evidence brought by the parties to dispute or hears the testimonies of partisan experts brought by the parties^[4]. This not only forces the EU Court to play a role as the scientific judge it is unable to play, but the values of expert evidence brought by the parties are also limited, since it is difficult not to see the partisan experts as hired guns. Therefore, the opinions expressed by the court-appointed experts will carry more weight than those expressed by the partisan experts^[5]. Thus, this thesis suggests that, the EU Court should appoint the experts on its own motion^[6], instead of relying on the partisan experts.

In order to encourage the EU Court to use the similar regime like the expert group provided by the WTO law, it is reasonable to look at the reasons discouraging the EU Court to use the expert evidence. Indeed, the use of an expert group is time-consuming, but it may be too high a price to pay for informed adjudications^[7]. Also, relying on the external advices may replace the assessments made by the EU Committees or Agencies to support the contested measures. As a result, both the scientific and institutional legitimacy of these EU Committees or Agencies would be questioned^[8]. However, in order to prevent the EU institutions from abusing the precautionary principle by constructing scientific uncertainty, it is necessary for the EU Court to review the divergently scientific opinions the institutions rely on is at least coming from qualified and respect sources, so that the basic procedural guarantee can be ensured. Without a judicial review carried by the EU Court to assess the decisions of the EU Institutions, the EU institutions may easily escape any control by exercising their powers in the technical field^[9]. Even the EU institutions are entitled to enjoy a wide discretion in certain fields^[10], in order for the EU Court to be able to examine whether the institutions has taken into account all scientific evidence available as well as the latest international research^[11], appointing an expert is necessary to complete the competence of the EU Court.

However, one question still arises. Who is suitable for the EU Court to consult? Considering the fact that litigations before the EU Court are often between EU institutions or between the EU institutions and Member States, it is not appropriate to rely on the opinions offered by the EU Scientific Committees or Agencies, in order to avoid the biased situation^[12]. Also, there is no hierarchy between the national research bodies and the EU’s research bodies^[13]. One thing the EU Court can do is to avoid appointing the same body to examine the opinion it made^[14]. As Alemanno argued, the opinions of the EU scientific bodies do not have precedence over diverging national opinions^[15].

Nevertheless, even if the EU Court is willing to appoint the expert group on its own motion, due to the lack of the scientific background of the EU Court, it is still difficult for the EU Court to appoint the appropriate experts. We would recommend that it may be helpful for the EU Court to appoint the scientific clerks to assist the Court when selecting the experts, or the thorough way is to appoint the ad hoc assessors with relevant scientific expertise sitting on the bench to assist the deliberation without the right to vote.

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[1] A. Alemanno, ‘The Dialogue between Judges and Experts in WTO and EU’, in Fontanelli, Martinico, and Carrozza ed., Shaping Rule of Law Through Dialogue: International and Supranational Experience, Europa Law Publishing 2010, at p. 361.

[2] D. Bodansky, ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law’, (1999) 93 AJIL 596, at p. 622.

[3] A. Alemanno, Trade in Food, Regulatory and Judicial Approaches to Food Safety, Cameron 2007, at p. 358.

[4] B. Barbier de La Serre and Anne-Lise Sibony, ‘Expert Evidence Before the EC Courts’, (2008) CML Rev. 45, at pp. 966-968.

[5] J. Pauwelyn, ‘The Use of Experts in WTO Dispute Settlement’, (2002) 51 ICQL 325, at p. 334.

[6] It is admitted that, neutral experts are neither more competent than partisan experts, nor are they always without bias, nevertheless, as long as they do not have any interest conflicts or related to one of the parties, or they have disclosed their relations to both parties of the litigations, they are still comparatively independent from the parties, see Howard, ‘The Neutral Expert: A Plausible Threat to Justice’, (1991) Criminal Law Review 98, at p. 101.

[7] B. Barbier de La Serre and Anne-Lise Sibony, ‘Expert Evidence Before the EC Courts’, (2008) CML Rev. 45, at p. 973.

[8] A. Alemanno, ‘The Dialogue between Judges and Experts in WTO and EU’, in Fontanelli, Martinico, and Carrozza ed., Shaping Rule of Law Through Dialogue: International and Supranational Experience, Europa Law Publishing 2010, at p. 363.

[9] B. Barbier de La Serre and Anne-Lise Sibony, ‘Expert Evidence Before the EC Courts’, (2008) CML Rev. 45, at p. 958.

[10] Case C-157/96, National Farmers’ Union and Others [1998] ECR I-2211, para. 39.

[11] Case C -191/01, Commission v Denmark [2003] ECR 9693, para. 52.

[12] T. Christoforou, ‘Settlement of Science-Based Trade Disputes in the WTO: A Critical Review of the Developing Case Law in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty’, (1999-2000) 8 N.Y.U. Envtl. L. J. 622, at pp. 630-631.

[13] A. Alemanno, Trade in Food, Regulatory and Judicial Approaches to Food Safety, Cameron 2007, at p. 361.

[14] A. Alemanno, ‘The Dialogue between Judges and Experts in WTO and EU’, in Fontanelli, Martinico, and Carrozza ed., Shaping Rule of Law Through Dialogue: International and Supranational Experience, Europa Law Publishing 2010, at p. 363.

[15] More details see A. Alemanno, ‘Food Safety and the Single European Market’, in C. Ansel and D. Vogel (eds), What;’s the Beef? The Contested Governance of European Food Safety, MIT Press 2006.

九二共識留給台灣的空間

九二共識，一個中國、各自表述，對岸在意的是一個中國，我們在意的是各自表述。支持九二共識的有以下幾派:

a) 目標是透過經濟整合，邁向政治整合或統一的(程度上也有終極統一、香港模式、歐盟模式的、邦聯說)
b) 目標是透過經濟整合，避免台灣在東亞區域經濟整合中被邊緣化，政治上維持各自表述，追求維持實質分裂的(遵憲派)
c) 目標是透過經濟整合，避免台灣在東亞區域經濟整合中被邊緣化，政治上是假中華民國之殼上市，避免與中國發生激烈衝突，追求維持實質獨立的

這已經是很彈性的空間，可以讓心中神主牌不同的人們各取所需的選項了。