風險治理中法院應扮演的角色（一）

A. 好的風險治理，繫諸決定過程中民主與專業投入。一個風險決定的合法性，應蘊含合理性與正確性。面對科學無法確定的風險，固然一個決定是否正確，難以確定。至少要有一定的科學根據支持，方能做出限制人民權益的合理決定。風險決定，更是政治決定，政治部門除了作為代理人應有的權限外，也應該透過資訊揭露與利害關係人參與，讓決定過程中有更多直接民主因素投入，也使更多受決定影響的人易於接受該風險決定。

B.  風險治理，應區分為風險評估與風險管理。在風險評估的階段，強調評估由適格（依個案先組成專案，因此不限於委員會委員）、獨立（至少要揭露個人利害關係）、透明（研究方法、假設、結果均應揭露）的科學家團體做成，並納入利害關係人討論（主要是風險溝通，並可借此蒐集資訊），必須盡量調查當時所有相關資訊，然後作出可以使風險決策者達成決定程度的評估。

在這個階段，風險評估要遠離政治，避免科學問題政治化，避免政治去操縱科學。但是，也要避免科學家的盲點與擅斷，造成政治問題科學化。

C. 在風險管理的階段，一方面政治部門應重視風險溝通，可能更擴大利害關係人參與範圍，由其平衡經濟與非經濟利益，做出裁量決定。另一方面，政治部門不應只考慮科學意見，也應該將風險帶來的社會或倫理因素列入考量。

始終都該由，負政治責任的政治部門，決定該社會針對該風險的保護水準有多高，作出是否開發或是否限制某某食品添加物的決定。政治部門應該落實參與，重視溝通，不要一昧依靠科學意見，更不要拿科學當擋箭牌，讓政治問題科學化，逃避自己該負的責任。

D. 如果在風險管理階段，政府巧妙地也設置獨立委員會，不僅有審查科學意見的專業參與，也由一定程度代表社會中的各個多元勢力組成，這樣的獨立委員會作出的風險決定，既有專業，又有多元代表性，且遠離政府（但不必然遠離政治），是否更應受法院尊重？

E.  只要這個過程做的好，法院原則上不應該干預太多的。問題常常在於做不好時，法院如何透過司法控制，讓風險治理變得更好呢？

開放：台灣唯一的路

昨日成就我們的，可能是明日讓我們失去的。成也蕭何，敗也蕭何。台灣的經濟與財富，得力於大量出口累積。可是更多的開發中國家，正走著我們的老路，用同量的方式拼出口。我們還能跟中國大陸拼資本嗎?  我們還能跟東南亞國家拼勞力嗎?   

在資本與勞力密集產業之後，台灣能拼的，只剩知識資本了。可是，我們的大學、研究所教育，可以跟西方世界比嗎?   我們不可能明天，或是明年就生出一間哈佛大學。美國也曾經花了一百年在追趕歐洲呀，曾經優秀的美國人是以留學歐洲為榮的。

腳踏車，是人們眼中曾經的黃昏產業。可是這個傳統產業，卻以自有品牌、高技術、高價格的模式，持續成為台灣出口到國外的強力產品。

加拿大的官員是這樣說的：在加拿大的市場，腳踏車是華人的天下。高價位是台灣的天下，低價位是中國的天下。

除了茫然尋找 IT 產業之後，下一個可以成為台灣主力產業的嘗試。腳踏車的故事，也許正在提醒我們：開放帶來更多的競爭，但是留下來的往往是真正的強者。我們要留給下一代甚麼樣的台灣呢？我們是否能留給下一代可長可久的產業呢？

多層次的公法圖象: 國際法、(歐盟法)、國內法(中央與地方/聯邦制)

1. 由於現代自由貿易協定、雙邊投資協定的擴張的結果，現代的國際經濟法，早已跟國內公法，頻頻接觸、衝突與協調。許多國內公法習見的議題，如透明化、政府採購、公平交易法、反貪腐，也早已被搬上全面性的經濟協定(自由貿易協定的擴張)的國際平台來談。論者甚至指出，關於各國國內的天然資源管理，除了依循自由貿易原則交易外，尚應顧及某些開發中國家的天然資源，可能因自由貿易原則快速耗竭，而應在多邊體系下成立天然資然委員會協調並管理之。
2. 除此之外，全面性的經濟協定(自由貿易協定的擴張)，也早已觸及勞動保護、環境保護等因自由化加速亟需處理的國內社會矛盾問題。
3. 另一方面，關稅同盟條約的憲法化(歐盟)，區域型強力人權法院的成立(歐洲人權公約)，二戰後如雨後春筍般冒出的各類國際人權協定，都在尋求與國內的憲法、行政法對話、衝突與協調。
4. 因此，廣義的公法圖象，在歐盟，是國際法、歐盟法、國內法三層。在台灣，自我國主動納入兩公約始，簽署兩岸經濟合作協議框架、台日雙邊投資保障協議，加入複邊政府採購協議起，我們也進入國際法與國內法二層結構的時代。
5. 凡此，都在提醒我們，一個新研究框架應該產生，國際法學者與國內公法學者雙邊，應戮力進行對話與研究合作。

核四風雲又起: 兩種風險治理思維

1. 模型一: 美國版，依目前的科學水平，無法證實某種科技、產品或物質有危險，" 所以我們推定安全 " ，" 可能的風險發生率極低 " ，" 不使用失去的經濟利益極高 " ，所以可以在市場上使用。
2. 模型二: 歐盟版。依目前的科學水平，無法證實某種科技、產品或物質有危險，但是仍有科學無法確定的風險存在，" 當我們認為某些風險實現應予避免時 " ，"即便可能的風險發生率極低 " ，" 考量其實現可能為該社會帶來無法回復的損害" ，" 我們認為在科學對於該等物質、產品或科技有進一步答案前 " ，" 假使社會對避免該等風險實現有共識或多數意見 " ，" 我們應該暫時禁止使用某種科技、產品或物質 " 。
3. 這是，大西洋兩岸，對於風險應如何治理的兩種簡化思維。請留意，凡是 " ..... " 的文字，都是價值判斷或選擇，不是什麼普世價值，是需要該社會去進行對話的。
4. 我個人認為，要發動歐盟版的預防原則，必須有非常高的民主正當性，因為這是高度針對未來發展的政治判斷。
5. 最後，即便實施預防原則，也是暫時禁止。如果要邁向非核家園，那是更高的政治判斷，不應引用預防原則去支持。

荷蘭與丹麥對於法學博士畢業的要求

1. 博士是一個職缺，不是學生。
2. 因為是職缺，所以有薪水，同時在學校被視為職員的一份子。
3. 因為有薪水，家庭生活不會因此停滯，很多博士生在讀博期間結婚生子。
4. 因為很多博士畢業都會參與學術研究、智庫政策研究、或教學，所以博士生在學校會參與教學、研究中心運作。
5. 當然博士生的核心，還是其論文研究，但是研究主題通常都不是純憑個人興趣，多半跟該國社會或國際組織特定需要有關，有其實用性質與社會貢獻。
6. 我們被期待三年或四年完成論文，除非有特殊情況，在政府資助下，沒有無限期念下去的可能。所以，作博士研究，不僅有時間壓力，也有一定意義: 請在一定期限內完成論文。
7. 丹麥認為，最好在博士班期間，到其他國家的大學或研究中心交換，不要長期待在一處。
8. 我們也鼓勵，博士班期間，可以去跟研究有關的其他地方實習，例如國際組織。

EU Risk Governance : Some Potential Inconsistencies

From section 2 to section 3, it has been indicated that the ambitious risk governance regimes under EU law should aim to make a balance between free movement of goods and a high level protection of health, safety and environment[1]. Also, in the process of risk decision-making, regulators need to strike a balance between scientific and non-scientific concerns[2]. Therefore, the use of sound science and the incorporation of social and ethics concerns through public participation in the process of risk decision-making are both equally important for good risk governance[3]. However, the above sections also have shown that, in practice, many potential inconsistencies might exist between the ambitious claims and the real practices in EU risk governance.

In section 2, it has been mentioned that, in order to regain public confidence in the administration of risk by the EU and Member States, regulators chose to redesign the risk governance regimes by separating risk assessment from risk management and assigning risk assessment to the new creation of independent agencies composed of qualified and independent staff[4]. However, though the Commission also claimed to strengthen transparency and public participation in the process of risk decision-making to reflect social and ethic values[5], regulators in practice still tend to solely rely on scientific expertise to make decisions[6]. Sometimes, regulators even hind behind scientific expertise to pursue their own goals[7]. Therefore, it seems that the first  potential inconsistency existing between ambitious claims and the real practices by the regulators is that regulators  might not really add social and ethic concerns into their considerations.  Rather, it seems the dominating factor in the process of decision making is still scientific standards[8]. It can be also observed that in Commission’s Communication, the Commission did not pay much attention on non-scientific concerns like social and ethic values as it initially claimed to do[9].

The second potential inconsistency existing  between ambitious claims and the real practices by regulators is that new independent agencies might fail  to fulfill its tasks by independently examining the product promoted by producers. While those independent agencies claim to provide independent and excellent scientific advice, in practice, as Marjolein, Van Asselt and Vos have observed in Monsanto cases, they only examined product data provided by producers, rather than conducting independent studies by themselves[10]. In addition, they have even shown an uncertainty intolerance attitude to deny or refuse any uncertain information in their own assessment[11]. It is entirely contrary to the natures of uncertain risks they are required to assess, since uncertain risks, in essence, cannot be fully predicted or determined by science[12]. Since science cannot certain uncertain risks as it did for simple risks, it is therefore necessary to use the precautionary principle to protect important interests such as human health. If in practice, experts tend to deny r the existence of uncertainty, this  might   lead to worse situations that uncertain risks have not been adequately addressed[13]. 

The third potential inconsistency  existing between ambitious claims and the real practices by regulators is that, while the Commission claimed itself as a risk regulator to make risk management decisions, in practice, it seems that the Commission tends to follow the advice offered by independent agencies[14]. Although both academic and the decision of the European Courts claimed it should be for the political organs to make risk management decisions[15], in practice, as scholars observed, the relationship between the Commission and independent agencies is as the blind driver (the Commission) guided by independent agencies[16]. The agency, per se, might  have become the real risk manager in EU risk governance. This would  lead to the concern about accountability, since agencies, as the real player, is not accountable for the public and is not subject to judicial review of the European Courts[17].

The fourth potential inconsistency existing  between ambitious claims and the real practices by the European Courts is that, though the Commission should be bound by its Communication[18], also the European Courts confirmed this point in their rulings[19], the European Courts did not virtually review the regulatory practices of the Commission as the Commission promised in its Communication . In Pfizer, the General Court did not examine whether the Commission has presented the equal scientific evidence to support its own decisions, when its decisions is contrary to the opinions provided by the relevant agencies or professional committees[20]. Again, later in Gowan[21], the court of Justice of the European Union did not require the procedural guarantees the EU institutions ought to offer by asking the Commission to provide a statement of reasons with a scientific level at least commensurate with the opinions offered by its committees, when it departed from the scientific opinions of its committees[22].

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[1] See A. Alemanno, The Shaping of European Risk Regulation by Community Courts, Jean Monnet Working Paper 18/08, p. 8.

[2] See M. Everson and E. Vos, European Risk Governance in a Global Context, in E. Vos, (ed.). European Risk Governance: its science, its inconclusiveness and its effectiveness, Connex Report Series 2008, p. 22.

[3] Ibid, p. 25.

[4] See G. Skogstad, ‘Legitimacy and/or policy effectiveness? Network governance and GMO regulation in the European Union’, Journal of European Public Policy, (2003), 10 (3), pp. 321-338, p. 325.

[5] See, M. Everson and E. Vos, supra note 2, p. 17.

[6] Ibid, p. 17.

[7] M.B. A. Van Asselt and E. Vos, ‘The Precautionary Principle and the Uncertainty Paradox’, Journal of Risk Research, 2006 9 (4) 313, pp. 331-333.

[8] M. Everson and E. Vos, supra note 2, p. 21.

[9] E. Fisher,‘Reviews: The European Commission’s Communication on the Precautionary Principle’, Journal of Environmental Law, 12 (3) 2000, p. 404.

[10] See B. A, Marjolein, M. B. A. Van Asselt and E. Vos, ‘Wrestling with Uncertain Risks : EU Regulation of GMOs and the Uncertainty Paradox’, Journal of Risk Research, 2008, Vol. 11, No. 1-2, 281-300, p. 284.

[11] Ibid, pp. 284-285.

[12] M.B. A. Van Asselt and E. Vos, ‘The Precautionary Principle and the Uncertainty Paradox’, Journal of Risk Research, 2006 9 (4) 313, pp. 314-316.

[13] B. Wynne, ‘Creating Public Alienation: Expert Cultures of Risks and Ethics’, Science as Culture, 2001, 10 (4), 445-481, p. 458.

[14] E. Vos and F. A. Wendler , ‘Food Safety Regulation at the EU Level’, in E. Vos and F. A. Wendler (eds.), Food Safety Regulation in Europe-A comparative Institutional Analysis (Ius Commune Europarum, 62), (Anmtwerp: Intersentia), 65-138, p. 122.

[15] See Case T-13/99, Pfizer, para. 151.

[16] E. Vos and F. A. Wendler, supra note 14, p. 122.

[17] See M. de Visser, “Judicial accountability and new governance ", Legal Issues of Economic Integration, (2010) 37(1), pp. 41-60.

[18] N. de Sadeleer, ‘The Precautionary Principle in EC Health and Environmental Law’, European Law Journal, 12 (2) 2006, 139-173, pp. 141-142.

[19] See Case T-13/99, Pfizer,  para. 125.

[20] E. Vos, ‘Antibiotics, the Precautionary Principle and the Court of First Instance’, 11 MJ (2) 2004, p. 199.

[21] Case C-77/09, Gowan Comércio Internacional e Serviços Lda v Ministero della Salute, Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 22 December 2010, not yet reported.

[22] A. Alemanno, Annotation of European Court of Justice, Case C-79/09, Gowan Comércio Internacional e Serviços Lda v. Ministero Della Salute (Precautionary Principle), (2011) 48 CML Rev. 4, at p. 9. 

法律與社會科學結合: 一條漫漫長路

• 回憶: 寫第一篇碩士論文時，花了一章，從全球化寫到跨國企業，寫到台灣進入後工業時代，從黑手變頭家，走向高科技代工，最後以哈佛管理學院對趨勢科技的個案分析作結，去思考新型態的台灣跨國公司。看起來很炫，但在這個時期，法律仍是法律，社會科學仍是社會科學。
• 到了第二篇碩士論文，用法律經濟學，去分析歐洲公司法的新形態歐洲公司，所可能引發的規範競爭。雖然寫出了新意，還是讓經濟學與實證研究，牽著法律的鼻子走。
• 到了第三篇碩士論文，藉由風險社會學者與法律學者的合作文獻，去觀察歐盟法院在個案中針對風險管制措施的審查，依然是拿社會科學規範化的尺，去量法院的判決。
• 一直到最近寫博士論文，我才成功地整理若干文獻，從科學社會學揭示的兩種不同的風險類型，去談其對唯科學論主導下、風險管制模型的衝擊，去反映科學與俗民對風險認知不同的衝突與平衡，在新治理觀下、法院可能角色的扮演。