半生榮、半生辱

■曾經接觸命理學，對我的幫助很大。一個人一輩子一帆風順很難，大部分的人都是半生榮、半生辱。那麼，我們寧可前面吃足苦頭，也不要老來摔跟斗。


■柏楊老先生的白話資治通鑑，也有一集叫半截英雄，形容梁武帝蕭衍的一生，認為很多人少時成名，除了實力，也有幾分運氣，未必一輩子都能禁的起考驗。

■謹此與各位朋友、師長分享: 順風時多謹慎、逆風時多智慧，時來都有運轉，人生都有豐年時。

■最終佛法常說: 應無所住而生其心，如果順逆都能不動心，那是真解脫也。

文化中國與百年台灣

一八四零年許，英國的大砲打開中國的大門，西方列強開始注意台灣，這個不受當時清王朝重視的小島。儘管有劉銘傳在台的新政(占領一個島一百五十年後才設省)，五十年後，一八九零許，清王朝把台灣輸給了日本。

一九四五年，又一個五十年後，中國用極其慘烈的代價，贏得對日戰爭勝利，台灣被要回來了，卻沒有被好好地珍惜。二二八事件，至少證明了當時的國民黨政權，對於如何統治一個已失去五十年的島嶼，多麼地不用心。

一九八九年，又一個五十年，中國剛剛結束了六四事件，台灣卻向民主化的腳步邁進。終結萬年國民代表大會，總統直選，台灣一步步向政治現代化的道路摸索前進，而之前五十年台灣社會已累積了豐富的地方政治選舉，並且一個強有力的反對黨－民主進步黨逐漸成熟。

 

對於一九八九年以前的來自中國大陸移進台灣的舊移民，與中國已是一百年以上的隔絕，對於一九四零年代從中國大陸移進台灣的新移民，與中國也是至少五十年的隔絕。因此，兩岸間的陌生、隔閡、誤解是正常的，也唯有透過多交流增進了解，與中國大陸統一才會慢慢變成台灣社會的可能主流選項。

 

台灣，一個清王朝眼中的邊疆，日本人腳下的殖民地，曾經處於被國民黨以少數統治多數的時光，比任何時候都希望自己可以決定自己的命運－無論與中國統一，或是從中國獨立。一個再以戰爭結束分裂的選擇，不僅將開啟外國勢力干涉之機(一如伊拉克之於科威特)，即便成功阻止外國勢力干涉，戰爭也終將在兩岸人民心中留下永遠的傷痕。

 

台灣，透過新舊移民的五十年的努力，在這個世界佔據了全球前二十大經濟體的位置，從僅僅二千三百多萬人口的小市場出發，開始有HTC、ACER、GIANT等全球性的品牌行銷全球，並且獲得全球上百個國家免簽證的待遇，也是世界貿易組織的會員之一，這一切說明台灣在中國心中，不應該僅僅被當成 ”一省 “ 看待。

 

台灣，依然傳承了古老的中國的儒、釋、道文化，並且是華人社會第一個透過人民直接選舉決定最高領導人(相對於中國大陸、港、澳)，第一個實現政黨輪替(相對於新加坡)，也是第一個以非城市經濟體的身分(相對於港、星)、真正靠工業踏上國際經濟舞台。因此，中國大陸應該珍惜台灣的現狀，珍惜台灣過去五十年民主發展的經驗，珍惜台灣現代化的經驗，調整自己社會發展的腳步，為兩岸終局實現和平奠定基礎。

 

 

 

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金正日之死: 東亞風雲起

金正日死了，是不是干我們台灣人屁事呢? 當然不是呀，北韓動亂將牽扯整個東亞局勢。
1.我們知道北韓長年陷入饑饉，專制家族政權的第三代接班本來就不易(台灣就只有傳兩代)，不知道老臣們是否都會支持金正恩接班，加上這個第三代浮上檯面的時間有限，人民是否能像接受金正日一樣接受他是個疑問，北韓也很可能會陷入亂局呀。

2.一旦北韓陷入亂局，中國大陸、南韓、美國都可能在朝鮮半島出兵，加上台灣又將選出新的總統領導人(如果萬一要政權接替)，整個東亞頓時陷入的不穩定情境。

3.在整個全球經濟已因歐債、美國陷入經濟疲軟之際，此時若因北韓爆發區域武裝對抗，使的原本最有能力經濟成長的亞洲陷入動盪，將可能造成二次衰退註定到來，並加速惡化全球其他地區經濟局勢。

4.對於台灣來說，在地緣政治上，必須非常謹慎，特別當美、中兩強可能重新在朝鮮半島上對峙時，在經濟層面上，假若中、美、日、韓因武裝衝突更行衰退，特別是美、中兩強，台灣的經濟將是短多(因南韓首受衝擊)長空。

5.我們應該持續緊密地觀察北韓局勢發展，金正恩是否能順利接班。

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2012 台灣副總統候選人辯論: 自由貿易協定議題(是否加入TPP)

這一次的辯論，在自由貿易協定議題上(中央社的提問相對有水準)，

1. 親民黨:  林瑞雄先生我是聽到最後才知道，喔，ECFA 比 TPP(泛太平洋經濟協定) 重要(橘)。
2. 國民黨:  吳敦義院長，公開對大眾說兩岸經濟架構協議不符合WTO規範，不僅是失言，這段錄影還會成為日後我們被美、歐盟在WTO攻擊的證據(這種事兩岸私底下眉來眼去就算了，怎麼可以公然講自己違反國際法，搖頭，連古巴都不會幹這種事)，總體立場看起來，藍對TPP興趣不高。
3. 民進黨:  蘇嘉全很清楚表達，民進黨不放棄與中國大陸走經濟對抗路線，重是亞太區域平衡，將在台灣農業有所犧牲下，推動TPP，加入泛美聯盟。

超完美謀殺：理性與瘋狂

在遙遠的吉諾比亞王國，發生了一件駭人聽聞的事。
五年前，一位年輕有為、畢業於吉諾比亞第一大學法學院(當年律師考試第一名及格)、並取得哈佛法學碩士學位的明星刑事法律師提里昂，在家中被發現於摯友傑森與愛妻安娜貝爾身旁，當時提里昂已深陷瘋狂。儘管證據指出，提里昂趁好友與其愛妻床上恩愛之際，以高爾夫球桿擊碎二人胸骨導致二人死亡，由於當時提里昂狀似深陷瘋狂，法院傳喚吉諾比亞王國最有名的心理醫生瑪莉蓮博士對提里昂進行心神鑑定，瑪莉蓮證實提里昂因眼見摯友傑森與愛妻安娜貝爾背叛自己陷於瘋狂，當時已喪失心神，法院遂判決提里昂有罪，但無須服刑，強制進入精神病院進行治療。
五年後，提里昂的大學同學，新銳檢察官史塔克無意間發現，提里昂已治療出院，並且以化學藥物毀容，以化名身分，在其愛子吉米(因無人監護，由提里昂恩師、最高法院法官特利斯坦夫婦收養)住家所在社區，擔任清潔工，默默守護自己的兒子上下學。史塔克認為，一般人絕無可能在發瘋後，以如此縝密而理性的方式守護自己的兒子，並且提里昂在案發前並無任何心理異常徵兆，遂懷疑當時的法院與鑑定專家心理醫生瑪莉蓮博士遭其欺騙，以新證據發現為由，向吉諾比亞王國最高法院申請再審，重開審判(當時程序上，一人反對、四人贊成重開)。
再審當日，提里昂坦言指出: 當日由於目睹愛妻與摯友背叛自己，狂怒之下擊殺二人，然而殺戮後立即警醒: 自己還有五歲的年幼愛子吉米，如坦承其行，愛子將無人可依靠(摯友傑森為其教父，提里昂出身孤兒院並無雙親)，故而裝瘋。從當時現場遺留證據來看，鑑定專家物理學家斷定，若非陷入暴怒瘋狂，一般人無此臂力能以高爾夫球桿擊碎二人胸骨；鑑定專家心理醫生瑪莉蓮博士更作證指出: 如果一切從頭，不了解此一情狀，自己仍會依其專業，判定提里昂已喪失心神能力；當時承審法官密爾指出，自己是依論理法則做出判決，因為心理鑑定已超出自己的專業能力判斷範圍，遂選擇採納鑑定專家的專業心理意見，判決提里昂有罪但免刑。
提里昂在當日判決辯稱: 其一、自己已身受審判，並非無罪，而是有罪免刑，依一事不二審之法理，自己已通過法律的天平審判；其二、自己已身敗名裂，被烙印為犯罪人，對社會已無危險性，且無再犯可能；其三、任何人處於自己情境下，都不能免於暴怒擊殺摯友與愛妻之衝動，即便之前法院採用的鑑定證據有瑕疵，物理學家鑑定意見仍然指出: 若非陷入暴怒瘋狂，一般人無此臂力能以高爾夫球桿擊碎二人胸骨，自己應因暴怒殺人罪獲減刑；其四、吉諾比亞王國正努力加入歐盟，歐盟的條件之一就是廢除死刑，此時如判自己死刑將對國家前途不利。其五、吉諾比亞傳統宗教嚴禁自殺，此時法院如仍判決自己唯一死刑，無疑將自己的坦誠以告陷於自殺情境，有違吉諾比亞傳統宗教信仰，違反吉諾比亞王國憲法上珍視的宗教自由。
再審檢察官史塔克指出，法律的尊嚴不容被詐騙輕視，被告顯然有備而來，先後拖辭，以喪失心神能力與陷於暴怒企圖脫免刑責，法院應本於自由心證，依照吉諾比亞王國刑法，對被告的屠殺判決唯一死刑。
輿論指出: 提里昂對社會已無危險，最大報吉諾比亞自由報並以頭版大張照片，刊出提里昂愛子吉米天真注視其父受審的無辜神情，許多婦女紛紛致電吉諾比亞王國國王馬龍二世，請求國王特赦提里昂，國王以尊重司法為由，抱病前往國外醫院治療，拒絕後續回應。



判決前夕，五位最高法院法官有二人成功申請迴避，分別是提里昂的恩師，吉諾比亞刑法之父特里斯坦法官，與過去不斷與提里昂就刑法問題在報上進行筆戰，雙方宿有仇隙的貝里爾法官。剩下三人，一人認為提里昂有罪，一人認為一罪不容再審，再審根本不應重開，你是最後一名法官，在判決即將公布的風雨前夕，你將如何做出關鍵性的最後判決?

The Oncoming 2012 Taiwan President Election and Its Political Indications

Currently, Taiwan only completed a FTA framework with China. It is so-called ECFA. It is estimated that all the sub-trade agreements including trade in goods, trade in service, indestment protection under the ECFA between Taiwan and China would not be completed before the oncoming Taiwan President's Election in the beginning of 2012. I think China want to wait the result of Taiwan's oncoming President Election.

It is clear that if the opposing party, DPP, win this election and still continue its insist about denying the so-callled one-China consensus conducted in 1992, which is one of the core interests emphasized by China, all the sub-trade agreements negotiations would fail in the end. The rest Taiwan can do is to strive for joing the TPP led by the US. The costs of joing the TPP is no dount higher than ECFA and the completion of TPP in 2012 will still be uncertain, due its high threshold of libralization requirement proporsedby the US.

I would like to indicate the benefits and costs of the result of this oncoming election, and hopefully, everyone in Taiwan realizes what the consequence it will be.

面對失落的十年: 以再生產為核心的發展觀

如果你家欠了一堆錢，總是要還債吧，但是家裡哪麼多人也要吃呀。國家也是，在經濟衰退的時候，舉債過多即便沒有外債，也會影響國際社會對該國貨幣的評估。減少支出，第一個倒楣的就是窮人與弱勢族群。再生產的前提在於，這個國家必須能走下去，收支要平衡。既然政府支出很難大幅刪減，至少要加稅吧。


對於加稅最大的反彈是，逼跨國企業出走，削弱中小企業的競爭力。但它忽略了勞工所得過低，物價卻持續上漲，貧富差距持續拉大的社會，不僅社會秩序難以維持(犯罪率提高)，孩子也越來越少了，要鼓勵大家成立家庭，不能沒有一定所得吧。並且，真正能出走的跨國企業，也未必願意放棄跟母國間建立的政商關係，鴻海在巴西怎麼能比在台灣爽呢?對於中小企業，我們總要試試，才知道老闆的口袋有多深吧。

地層在下陷，暴雨使過度開發的山坡地成為土石流的天堂，殺雞取卵的開發模式，讓我們付出更多的經濟成本，也讓環境越來越難以居住，再生產也包括這塊土地可以繼續合理的使用，我們該重視環保這一塊；但是，石化業不可能明天就放棄，產業結構調整需要時間，再生產的前提是，設計制度誘因讓企業往低汙染、高產值的產業投資與發展。

從前，我們是不對話的社會。大學讀哪個系不重要，出社會做事又是另一回事，學非所用很正常。現在不行了，教育系統必須跟產業對話，否則我們讓孩子與家長浪費青春與金錢在學校讀書，政府、銀行與個人負擔高額的學貸，合理嗎? 除了個人必須自覺讀書要有職場規劃，各個山頭也請妳們對話一下吧。否則，台灣既無吸引高技術人才來台灣的雄厚本錢(歐盟也搶不贏美國的)，總不能坐視一邊失業竄升、一邊卻有企業找不到人才，這樣的矛盾持續吧。教育再生產的目標，不僅止於社會化的傳遞，也必須回應一個社會、乃至於個人的發展需求，別再強迫大家拼SCI、SSCI了，搞點具體有助於本土社會需要的科研吧。

台灣缺乏天然資源，尤其缺乏能源。非核家園的夢很美，可是如何實現呢。如何讓我們合理負擔繼續再生產、再繁衍的能源成本呢? 如果認為核能是不能賭的威脅，請提出依賴化石能源以外的穩定選項吧。

我們不可能遠離國際競爭，也不可能在區域經濟整合的朗潮中被邊緣化後，經濟還能延續。可是，自由化不是大門一開了事，我們做好忍痛的準備了嗎? 如何度過自由化深化的陣痛期，讓多數人可以再生產、有工作下去，而不是二十年投入的人力資源心血白白浪費，中年失業徒留超商打工一途，人力資源的浪費才更值得你我深思呀。

後記: 被人抱怨每次都不寫人話，特寫此文；生命存在的本質之一是延續，生存是基本的正義，特以再生產為題，撰寫此文。

Taiwan's economic situation before the 2012 oncoming President's election

Taiwan's government has owed around 5,000 billion NT dollars, though most are not borrowed from foreigners. However, the tax rates are lowering, the costs of social welfare are increasing. Over the past ten years, the substabntial average income of per national almost remains the same, while, the prices of goods and services are still raising. The worst point is that during President Ma's first term, we only completed one FTA ' Framework ' with China plus early harvest clause. Basically, none of the sub-substantial trade agreements relating to trade, service, or investment can be done with China before the end of Ma's first term.


How can Taiwan keep going? Do we really learn anything from Greece, Italy, and Spain? Interests groups and NGOs are dividing and they never think about Taiwan's overall situation. It is no doubt that politicians are captured by votes. Some may say Ma can do more during his secoind term of President, if he can win the election. But I really doubt.

自由心證的限制、鑑定之必要與專家參審~林鈺雄老師刑訴教科書讀後感

1. 先區分證據能力與證明力。但是國際法沒有證據能力的規定。
2. 證明力由法官依自由心證，按論理與經驗法則評價。
3. 自由心證的限制在於，法官對於已經確定的科學法則，不得再依自由心證評價，例如地心引力。
4. 但是，何謂確定的科學法則，科學確定往往是暫時被證明的假設，今天被肯定的科學法則，明天可能會被推翻。
5. 遇有法官無法了解的專業事實時，法官有義務使用鑑定人。這點倒是很有趣，到底法官仍有裁量權，還是有義務非用鑑定不可呢?
6. 林認為，鑑定只是證據方法，對照許世宦則指出，鑑定不只是證據方法，也是法院的延伸。這是否是民刑事程序的本質不同，還是對德國法的詮釋不同。至少，法國民事訴訟法將鑑定視為法院的延伸。
7. 林認為，與其採用專家參審，不如落實鑑定，認為實務上問題出在鑑定人未出庭接受兩造詢問，鑑定人的公正性問題(醫療鑑定出現袒護自己人)，但沒有去討論鑑定人與法官間的互動。尤其，法官是否了解鑑定人提出的科學證據報告或競爭法上的經濟分析報告，還有某些法領域是否事實與法律難以截然二分。即便林對國內法的看法肯定，能否對國際法做出同樣結論，仍是問號?

值得收藏的對話錄: 徐博士開講~一個科技人的心聲: 台灣電子業的將來

這篇是徐博士，我的老同學的貢獻，因為覺得對話值得紀錄，編輯如下，所有的相關權利應歸我的老同學所有。感嘆，那些年我們在靜心時，都沒想到世界變得如此複雜吧。

1.          徐: 4年國防替代役，吸引了不少台清交成的科學、工程優秀學生，4年後年紀也大了，收入也高了，工作也有保障了，可能就不想出國了。" 這點的確是這樣沒錯。

黃回應: 其實，台灣的GDP 十年停滯不前，一直沒辦法產業升級，工科的男兒們也要負一點責任啦；當然，另一方面，商業創新也很重要。

徐: 這點其實也不能怪我們啦！剛畢業那時候大多數人包括我只想要出去賺錢，有的人是因為小時候家裡環境不好所以要趕快出來賺錢，有的人是因為公司開的條件實在太誘人(一年幾百萬能不吸引人嗎？)

黃: 唉，我知道，這是 " 結構 " 問題，但你看到這個結構，慢慢不能用了，還蠻擔心未來台灣產業的。

徐: 相較之下出國唸書當然沒有什麼吸引力，當時PTT留學版最流行的說法就是: 你要考慮機會成本啊！唸碩士沒有獎學金(燒自己的錢)，念博士要花個五年(不用花自己的錢，可是比你同學少賺很多錢)，又不一定唸的完。還要考GRE/TOEFL......

黃: 是呀，我同意呀；我現在如果在馬大念博士，也沒有錢，肯定也是少賺了一些錢，但是這個社會都沒有人去做基礎科學研究或冷僻學門，產業一直缺乏核心技術，大家都不生孩子，持續下去，我們每個人都是理性的經濟人，但這個社會就會衰敗下去；by the way, 後來怎麼會改變想法，出來念博士呢?

徐: 我只能說，我承認年輕時我的想法是滿膚淺的，眼光也看不到這麼遠。畢竟當時的自己還算是個中產階級，待的產業當時看來也不錯，對於未來的事還有身在其他產業的人們的事也不太願意花時間去想去體會。有點像是社會的既得利益者不食人間煙火(我的既得利益相較其他人不算多，沒拿過公司的股票，幾乎正常上下班)......但是有一天當公司開始半哄半勸員工簽切結書、放無薪假、接受超長工時......等等這把火燒到自己身上，你就開始慢慢能體會以前你體會不到的感覺。

徐: 念博士這件事，說老實話，當時只是想找一個可以兼顧家庭 (老婆在波士頓) 又不用花自己錢就可以留在美國的辦法。念的領域對我來說是新的，雖然都是在 EE 裡面。其實沒有什麼太偉大的目的。不過現在回頭看過去這兩年，我會說如果真的讓我拿到這個學位的話，我認為這段期間受的訓練挺值得的。

黃: ‎" 我只能說，我承認年輕時我的想法是滿膚淺的，眼光也看不到這麼遠。" 同學，別這樣說，大家都是凡人，我之前是找不到好工作，才去經濟部當法務的，根本就不是計畫好的；唉，你在美國應該看到更多科技的進展，對台灣的前景感覺如何呢?

2.          徐: 其他產業我不熟就不評論了。半導體這邊，DRAM 完蛋，LCD 的未來會步上 DRAM 的後塵，在可看見的未來有競爭力而且能夠搬上檯面的只有台積電&高階製程設計服務(重點是服務而不是製造)。以上是針對半導體製造&設計服務而言。IC 設計好一些，不過大部分也都是做 Me Too 的產品或者靠富爸爸在背後撐腰，可預見的未來是照這樣下去會變成打不進新產品供應鏈 (前無去路，你看現在的 smart phone & TouchPad)，中國也慢慢會趕上(後有追兵，前一陣子有消息出來說中國的 IC 設計公司在高階製程下線 tape-out 的數量已經大過台灣的設計公司，說明台灣大部分的公司無心 & 沒有錢投入研發)。

黃: 將一般給科技業的租稅優惠取消，改成鼓勵投入研發項目，才給優惠是一條路，但是，我們現在在搞選舉，這種得罪大老闆的事，藍綠都不想幹；問題是，如你所說，就算有人才，老闆們不願投入資金，也枉然。

3.          徐: 我覺得比較可惜的是很多人才最後都跑去系統廠，就是人家做筆電手機代工的那些，不是說我輕看系統廠，而是他們做的東西毛利都太低，對公司和國家能產出的經濟貢獻太低了。台積電或IC設計公司毛利相對較高，不過一部分是政府租稅補貼的效果，而且繳稅也繳的少，對公司和國家能產出的經濟貢獻不能說沒有，只能說不算太高。DRAM 和 LCD 就別提了，失敗的產業政策不提也罷。馬總統上電視說不救DRAM不配當總統的話歷歷在目，當時我的想法是1.馬總統不懂這個產業 2.幕僚也不懂 3. 又是一樁政府&銀行被綁架血淋淋的案例。

台北市政府措施在美牛事件中的WTO適法性爭議

當代重要的挑戰之一，就是同時理解國內行政法與國際行政法，而且要避免以內國語言、思考習慣去解讀國際行政法，這是我認為國內學界可能出現的盲點。

WTO 法說: 中央政府在憲法的可能架構內，為地方政府的貿易限制措施負責。所以假使地方政府在該國憲法架構下有自治權，確實中央政府有機會藉此託辭，受限於憲法架構，無法履行國際法承諾。但這是純粹法律、單看WTO法的玩法，它忽略了國際法生成於各國外交人員的互動中成為習慣、成文法化成為條約(意思是大家不是這樣在玩遊戲呀)，忽略了國際法的基本原則仍舊是: 不管你國內法規怎麼定，那是你家的事，就是要盡力履行國際條約義務。也忽略了WTO上訴小組明確在判決指出，WTO法不應與基本國際法分離(恰巧跟美國學者的論調相反)。也就是說，純談法理，任由地方政府制定貿易限制措施，不一定站的住腳的。

何況，純粹法律的操作，更忽略對手是誰的國際現實。

我們對法院的想像: 推動專家參審制

傳統上，對於法院的想像，在於法院應由專業的法律人擔任法官構成。可是，從以前的商業案件，到後來的海事、專利、稅務等案件，許多歐洲國家都有專家參審的制度。這在在說明，對於審判者的定義，不應侷限於專業的法律人。如果十九世紀，海事、商業案件被視為新穎，如果今日越來越多專利、稅務、投資、貿易爭議，被要求由特別的、國際的法院或仲裁處理的種種實踐，不只是提醒我們慣性思考中對審判者定義的狹隘，更提醒我們越來越多的案件，需要也要求審判者了解事實，光靠特別法院或仲裁可能不足以滿足紛爭解決的需求的。也因此，重新定義審判者或法院的組成，或許可以從促成專家參審制，透過專家參審官與法官合作共同審理案件，讓法院真正有能力審理案件事實。這也是回應專業分工日趨分殊的社會，適時促進法院回應社會變遷的一種辦法，發揮其被設定於好好解決紛爭的功能。

假使，如法國的研究顯示，法院甚少偏離專家意見，甚至將自己應處理的事實問題轉問專家，那我們寧可那個實質做決定的人變成專審官，至少他的偏見可以被檢視，他為他的決定實際負責，接受公眾監督，遠勝於他躲在專家的角色中，特別當交叉訊問在國際訴訟中不可見時。

What the EU Court Can Learn From the WTO Regarding the Use of Expert

Despite the limits of the use of individual experts in the current WTO dispute settlement, it is still a positive development to increase the use of expertise advice when assessing the scientific-based measures^[1]. Expert’s advice not only ensures the expert legitimacy^[2] of the panel’s decision, but it also reduces the level of scientific involvement of panels in disputes^[3]. Considering the merits of the use of an expert review group aforementioned, as the Pfizer case has shown the necessity for the EU court to engage in scientific issues, it is reasonable to encourage the EU Court to increase the use of an expert group to assist it to deal with scientific debates.

Currently, when assessing the scientific-based measures, the EU Court tends not to appoint the expert and only seeks the information from the evidence brought by the parties to dispute or hears the testimonies of partisan experts brought by the parties^[4]. This not only forces the EU Court to play a role as the scientific judge it is unable to play, but the values of expert evidence brought by the parties are also limited, since it is difficult not to see the partisan experts as hired guns. Therefore, the opinions expressed by the court-appointed experts will carry more weight than those expressed by the partisan experts^[5]. Thus, this thesis suggests that, the EU Court should appoint the experts on its own motion^[6], instead of relying on the partisan experts.

In order to encourage the EU Court to use the similar regime like the expert group provided by the WTO law, it is reasonable to look at the reasons discouraging the EU Court to use the expert evidence. Indeed, the use of an expert group is time-consuming, but it may be too high a price to pay for informed adjudications^[7]. Also, relying on the external advices may replace the assessments made by the EU Committees or Agencies to support the contested measures. As a result, both the scientific and institutional legitimacy of these EU Committees or Agencies would be questioned^[8]. However, in order to prevent the EU institutions from abusing the precautionary principle by constructing scientific uncertainty, it is necessary for the EU Court to review the divergently scientific opinions the institutions rely on is at least coming from qualified and respect sources, so that the basic procedural guarantee can be ensured. Without a judicial review carried by the EU Court to assess the decisions of the EU Institutions, the EU institutions may easily escape any control by exercising their powers in the technical field^[9]. Even the EU institutions are entitled to enjoy a wide discretion in certain fields^[10], in order for the EU Court to be able to examine whether the institutions has taken into account all scientific evidence available as well as the latest international research^[11], appointing an expert is necessary to complete the competence of the EU Court.

However, one question still arises. Who is suitable for the EU Court to consult? Considering the fact that litigations before the EU Court are often between EU institutions or between the EU institutions and Member States, it is not appropriate to rely on the opinions offered by the EU Scientific Committees or Agencies, in order to avoid the biased situation^[12]. Also, there is no hierarchy between the national research bodies and the EU’s research bodies^[13]. One thing the EU Court can do is to avoid appointing the same body to examine the opinion it made^[14]. As Alemanno argued, the opinions of the EU scientific bodies do not have precedence over diverging national opinions^[15].

Nevertheless, even if the EU Court is willing to appoint the expert group on its own motion, due to the lack of the scientific background of the EU Court, it is still difficult for the EU Court to appoint the appropriate experts. We would recommend that it may be helpful for the EU Court to appoint the scientific clerks to assist the Court when selecting the experts, or the thorough way is to appoint the ad hoc assessors with relevant scientific expertise sitting on the bench to assist the deliberation without the right to vote.

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[1] A. Alemanno, ‘The Dialogue between Judges and Experts in WTO and EU’, in Fontanelli, Martinico, and Carrozza ed., Shaping Rule of Law Through Dialogue: International and Supranational Experience, Europa Law Publishing 2010, at p. 361.

[2] D. Bodansky, ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law’, (1999) 93 AJIL 596, at p. 622.

[3] A. Alemanno, Trade in Food, Regulatory and Judicial Approaches to Food Safety, Cameron 2007, at p. 358.

[4] B. Barbier de La Serre and Anne-Lise Sibony, ‘Expert Evidence Before the EC Courts’, (2008) CML Rev. 45, at pp. 966-968.

[5] J. Pauwelyn, ‘The Use of Experts in WTO Dispute Settlement’, (2002) 51 ICQL 325, at p. 334.

[6] It is admitted that, neutral experts are neither more competent than partisan experts, nor are they always without bias, nevertheless, as long as they do not have any interest conflicts or related to one of the parties, or they have disclosed their relations to both parties of the litigations, they are still comparatively independent from the parties, see Howard, ‘The Neutral Expert: A Plausible Threat to Justice’, (1991) Criminal Law Review 98, at p. 101.

[7] B. Barbier de La Serre and Anne-Lise Sibony, ‘Expert Evidence Before the EC Courts’, (2008) CML Rev. 45, at p. 973.

[8] A. Alemanno, ‘The Dialogue between Judges and Experts in WTO and EU’, in Fontanelli, Martinico, and Carrozza ed., Shaping Rule of Law Through Dialogue: International and Supranational Experience, Europa Law Publishing 2010, at p. 363.

[9] B. Barbier de La Serre and Anne-Lise Sibony, ‘Expert Evidence Before the EC Courts’, (2008) CML Rev. 45, at p. 958.

[10] Case C-157/96, National Farmers’ Union and Others [1998] ECR I-2211, para. 39.

[11] Case C -191/01, Commission v Denmark [2003] ECR 9693, para. 52.

[12] T. Christoforou, ‘Settlement of Science-Based Trade Disputes in the WTO: A Critical Review of the Developing Case Law in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty’, (1999-2000) 8 N.Y.U. Envtl. L. J. 622, at pp. 630-631.

[13] A. Alemanno, Trade in Food, Regulatory and Judicial Approaches to Food Safety, Cameron 2007, at p. 361.

[14] A. Alemanno, ‘The Dialogue between Judges and Experts in WTO and EU’, in Fontanelli, Martinico, and Carrozza ed., Shaping Rule of Law Through Dialogue: International and Supranational Experience, Europa Law Publishing 2010, at p. 363.

[15] More details see A. Alemanno, ‘Food Safety and the Single European Market’, in C. Ansel and D. Vogel (eds), What;’s the Beef? The Contested Governance of European Food Safety, MIT Press 2006.

九二共識留給台灣的空間

九二共識，一個中國、各自表述，對岸在意的是一個中國，我們在意的是各自表述。支持九二共識的有以下幾派:

a) 目標是透過經濟整合，邁向政治整合或統一的(程度上也有終極統一、香港模式、歐盟模式的、邦聯說)
b) 目標是透過經濟整合，避免台灣在東亞區域經濟整合中被邊緣化，政治上維持各自表述，追求維持實質分裂的(遵憲派)
c) 目標是透過經濟整合，避免台灣在東亞區域經濟整合中被邊緣化，政治上是假中華民國之殼上市，避免與中國發生激烈衝突，追求維持實質獨立的

這已經是很彈性的空間，可以讓心中神主牌不同的人們各取所需的選項了。

Is Creating a Specialized Court a Good Idea to Solve Uncertainty Paradox?

Since eighteenth century in England, judges empanelled juries of merchants for commercial cases, in order to ensure that judge and jury together has the required expertise to decide the case^[1]. Later, the High Court and the Court of Appeal have the right to summon assessors to sit with the judges and to give advice on technical issues arising in the course of the litigation^[2]. Under English law, the high Court has several divisions, composed of two of the three judges who are not legally qualified but are appointed for their knowledge and experience. The similar examples like the commercial court (Tribunal de commerce) can also be found in France^[3].

Under Swiss Law, in four canons, civil matters could be heard in commercial court, if the cases involve commercial transactions of a certain importance and if at least the defendant is listed as firms in the Swiss commercial register. Commercial courts are composed of three judges and two assessors drawn from the local chambers of commerce^[4]. According to the literature, lay judges familiar with the field in question are of great help to the legal specialists to understand the facts of a case, in particular technical and commercial issues. The involvement of lay judges in question results in certain functional similarities with the arbitrational tribunals. As a result, over seventy percent of cases before the Swiss commercial courts end in conciliation, instead of a judgment^[5]. This may be seen as a good example of creating a specialized court.

All of above examples indicate that creating specialized courts is not unknown for the European countries and the need of such specialized courts has been long recognized.

Creating a specialized EU patent court is also raised by the Commission^[6]. Two advantages of creating a specialized court can be identified. First, specialized courts can be composed of specialized judges having proper training in certain fields. Second, since specialized courts are quickly confronted with a substantial number of cases, as a result, they enjoy a steep learning curve^[7]. However, the ECJ expressed that, providing in a specific article, separate from the general provisions applicable to the General Court, for the creation of a separate specialist chamber of the General Court and laying down specific rules on the commissioning the judges of that chamber entails ‘the risk of compromising the structure and integrity of that court^[8].’

Considering the difficulty for the EU Court to appoint the appropriate experts aforementioned, also the existence of uncertainty paradox between experts and judges, creating a specialized court may be a proper way to solve these problems. Nevertheless, the scientific disciplines involved in each case vary a lot. A policy debate would arise concerning the appropriate kinds of specialized courts. How many different kinds of specialized courts does the EU need to create? Therefore, this thesis would suggest that, following the ICJ’s approach, to appoint the ad hoc assessors with relevant scientific expertise sitting on the bench to assist the deliberation without the right to vote could be a fundamental remedy. As can be seen, this approach is also similar with the composition of the Swiss commercial court, which is a successful example of the specialized court in Europe.

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[1] J. A. Jolowicz, On Civil Procedure, Cambridge 2000, at p. 229.

[2] A. Dickey, ‘The Province and Function of Assessors in English Court’, (1970) 33 MLR 494.

[3] J. A. Jolowicz, On Civil Procedure, Cambridge 2000, at p. 265.

[4] F. Dessemontet and T. Ansay (eds.), Introduction to Swiss Law, Kluwer 2004, at p. 289.

[5] See, C. Platto ed., Economic Consequences of Litigation Worldwide, Kluwer 1999, at pp. 87-88.

[6] See proposal for a Council decision conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Justice in disputes relating to the Community patent, COM (2003) 807 final.

[7] B. Barbier de La Serre and Anne-Lise Sibony, ‘Expert Evidence Before the EC Courts’, (2008) CML Rev. 45, at pp. 979-980.

[8] See proposal for a Council Decision establishing the Community Patent Court and concerning appeals before the Court of First Instance-Opinion of the Court of Justice of the European Community, para. 37.

Demerits of the WTO Consulting System , Remedies, and What the EU Can Learn

Demerits of the WTO Consulting System , Remedies, and What the EU Can Learn  

1.The Lack of Professional Background to Commission the Experts

Apart from the delegation of the powers from the panel to its appointed experts, as mentioned before, neither the panel nor the WTO secretariat staff is the real experts who know how to select the qualified experts merely by looking at the CV, publications^[1]. And the EU Court may face the same problem when selecting the experts. It is even worse that the EU Court cannot rely on the EU Agencies to provide the list of candidates as the panel did.

Pauwelyn first suggested that, in trade disputes where only controversy is a question of fact, not the law, WTO Members would be advised to settle their disputes via the special arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU, instead of through the normal panel procedure. By doing so, the parties can ask a panel of scientists to settle their disputes. The similar approach can be found the United Nation Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS)[2]. Hence, in trade disputes where only controversy is a question of fact, it is admitted that a specialized tribunal may be more appropriate to settle the case than the normal court[3]. Article 9 of the TEU leaves the room to set up the specialized court.

Second, to nominate a panelist having the relevant scientific background can be helpful for the panel to select the experts. However, to further put a real scientific expert on the panel may not be a good idea, since the expert panelist may exert too much uncontrolled power over the other two panelists. Also, it blurs the line between expert-advisors and judicial decision-makers[4]. However, certain other international tribunals do have the right to commission an expert sitting on the bench to assist the deliberation without the right to vote. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), for instance, can appoint scientific assessors to assist the Court[5].

Another way to complement the competence of the panel is to appoint the scientists as part of the WTO secretariat staff to assist the panel to select the experts[6]. Nevertheless, as Barbier de La Serre and Sibony mentioned, in the past there was an in-house economist on the staff of the EU Court for the reporting judges to consult when dealing with the complex competition issues. Nonetheless, it was rarely to be used. It seems that many of the continental judges were very nervous about consulting outside the knowledge of the parties[7]. As long as the legal culture of the EU Court does not change, the idea would be unworkable.

Therefore, some available remedies can be used to assist the panel cannot be helpful for the EU Court. It might be more positive to consider the idea of setting up the specialized Court or to appoint the scientists as assessors sitting on the bench to assist the deliberation without the right to vote as the ICJ did.

2.  The Inability of Solving Scientific Conflicts

When appointing individual experts, the panel faces the problem of scientific conflicts. It is obvious that the panel tends to rely on the expert review group to solve this problem. Still, it is possible to have the dissenting opinion on the report issued by the group. How can the panel solve?

The Appellate Body in EC-Hormones held that, the results of risk assessment has to sufficiently support the SPS measures at issue and it added the following:

Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement does not require the risk assessment must necessarily embody only the view of a majority of the relevant scientific community. In some cases, the very existence of divergent views presented by qualified scientists who have investigated the particular issue at hand may indicate a state of scientific uncertainty. Responsible and representative governments may act in good faith on the basis of what, at a given time, may be a divergent opinion coming from the ‘qualified and respect sources’. By itself, this does not necessarily signal the absence of a reasonable relationship between the SPS measure and the risk assessment, and especially where the risk involved is life-threatening in character and is perceived to constitute a clear and imminent threat to public health and policy[8].

Subsequently, the Appellate Body in EC-Asbestos upheld that, the contested measures of Member States can be based on ‘a divergent opinion coming from qualified and respect sources’. Therefore, a panel needs not necessarily reach a decision under Article XX (b) of the GATT 1994 on the basis of the ‘preponderant’ weight of the evidence[9].

Pauwelyn argued that, by relying on the divergent opinion, as long as it is coming from the qualified and respect sources, the panel can put aside the arguments of scientific conflicts between the mainstream opinions and the minority opinions, by relying on the minority opinion to solve this issue[10].

Nonetheless, Panels are not competent to make substantive decisions on scientific disagreements[11]. Therefore, in assessing whether a divergent opinion is coming from qualified and respect sources, the WTO panel and the EU Court may still need to consult the other experts to assist them. The EU Court may uphold the EU’s measures or the measures of Member States departing from the EU harmonized standards by relying on the divergent view, as long as the disputing party can demonstrate that the divergent view it rely on is coming from qualified and respect sources, since the Appellate Body in EC-Hormones confirmed that, the very existence of divergent views presented by qualified scientists may indicate a state of scientific uncertainty[12].

3.  Uncertainty Paradox Remains in WTO Dispute Proceedings

As mentioned before, the uncertainty paradox^[13] results from the fact that science cannot provide decisive evidence on uncertain risks, lawyers and policy-makers appeal to science for some kind of plausibility proof^[14].

Gross argued that, in the mind of the typical lay juror, a scientific witness has a special aura of credibility[15]. Most often the panel wants simple and clear answers, even if the science cannot always have such answers. Moreover, upon the panel’s request, an expert may be asked to make a guess without being backed by empirical studies. And the expert’s guess may carry lots of weight on the panel’s mind. In EC-Hormones, Dr. Lucier was asked by the panel to express, in his view, between 0 and 1 in a million risk of cancer based on added hormones in beef production. While this statement was taken very seriously by the panel and the Appellate Body, in fact, it was not supported by any particular study[16].

Again, the uncertainty paradox remains in the WTO dispute settlement proceedings. If assessing the scientific evidence is unavoidable for the panel, the fundamental way is to complement the competence of the panel by appointing the scientists as part of the WTO secretariat staff to assist the panel or by appointing a panelist having the scientific background to assist the panel to avoid the uncertainty paradox.

In addition, it is also necessary to require that all statements by experts shall be backed up by data or studies and discloses those data and studies, so that the parties have opportunities to object the solidity of the evidence[17].

Back to the EU Court, it is suggested to appoint the scientists as assessors sitting on the bench to assist the deliberation without the right to vote. By doing so, this may thoroughly solve the uncertainty paradox it faces.

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[1] J. Pauwelyn, ‘The Use of Experts in WTO Dispute Settlement’, (2002) 51 ICQL 325, at p. 344.

[2] Annex VIII to the UNCLOS relates to fisheries, protection and preservation of the marine environment, marine scientific research and navigation.

[3] J. Pauwelyn, ‘The Use of Experts in WTO Dispute Settlement’, (2002) 51 ICQL 325, at p. 344.

[4] J. Pauwelyn, ‘The Use of Experts in WTO Dispute Settlement’, (2002) 51 ICQL 325, at p. 345.

[5] Article 30.2 of the Statute of the ICJ provides that, the Rules of the Court may provide for assessors to sit with the Court or with any of its chambers, without the right to vote. Article 9.1 of the Rules of the Court of the ICJ provides that, the Court may, either proprio motu or upon a request made not later than the closure of the written proceedings, decide, for the purpose of a contentious case or request for advisory opinion, to appoint assessors to sit with it without the right to vote.

[6] J. Pauwelyn, ‘The Use of Experts in WTO Dispute Settlement’, (2002) 51 ICQL 325, at p. 345.

[7] B. Barbier de La Serre and Anne-Lise Sibony, ‘Expert Evidence Before the EC Courts’, (2008) CML Rev. 45, at p. 954, footnote 81 about ‘ An EU Competition Court’.

[8] Appellate Body Report, EC-Hormones, para. 194.

[9] Appellate Body Report, EC-Asbestos, para. 178.

[10] J. Pauwelyn, ‘The Use of Experts in WTO Dispute Settlement’, (2002) 51 ICQL 325, at pp. 356-357.

[11] S. Brewer, ‘Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process’, 107 Yale L. J. 1535, at p. 1595.

[12] Appellate Body Report, EC-Hormones, para. 194.

[13] Van Asselt and E. Vos, ‘Precautionary Principle and the Uncertain Paradox’, (2006) Journal of Risk Research 9 (4), at pp. 317-318.

[14] Van Asselt and E. Vos, ‘The Precautionary Principle in Times of Intermingled Uncertainty and Risks: Some Regulatory Complexities’, Water Science and Technology, 52 (6) 2005, at p. 42. 

[15] P. Gross et al, ‘Clearing Away the Junk: Court-Appointed Experts, Scientifically Marginal Evidence, and the Silicone Gel Breast Implant Litigation,’ (2001) 56 Food & Drug L.J. 227, at p. 228.

[16] J. Pauwelyn, ‘The Use of Experts in WTO Dispute Settlement’, (2002) 51 ICQL 325, at pp. 349-350.

[17] J. Pauwelyn, ‘The Use of Experts in WTO Dispute Settlement’, (2002) 51 ICQL 325, at p. 350.